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This paper argues that the consumption value of education is an important motivation for the 
educational choice. While controlling for ability, we document that individuals are willing to 
forego substantial future wage returns in order to acquire a particular type of higher education. 
We document that the individuals who attended Teachers’ College in Norway during the 
1960's had an ex ante willingness to pay for the consumption value of this educational type of 
at least 34% of the present value of expected potential lifetime income. The ex post price for 
this consumption value turned out to be 39% of their potential lifetime income. 
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1. Introduction 
    The young individuals' educational choices determine the future skill level in a country. 
Just as important as the choice of educational level is the choice of educational type, which 
determines the future skill composition and also production possibilities. It is therefore 
important to understand what motivates the individuals' educational decisions. We observe 
high educational levels in countries with small or modest wage returns to education, as is seen 
in table 1 in the appendix. There are also significant differences in wages across different 
educational types, as documented by Daymont and Andrisiani (1984), James et al. (1989), 
Loury and Garman (1995), and Walker and Zhu (2003). In spite of this, many individuals 
choose to acquire high levels of education and major in educational directions that generate 
low wage returns. This seemingly is a puzzle under the human capital view of education as an 
investment, where future wages are considered the main motivation for the educational 
choice. But, the future wage return to education depends positively on abilities, and effort 
costs of completing the education depends negatively on abilities. One might thus claim that 
the reason why individuals choose different levels and types of education is different abilities. 
A well functioning labor market pays an individual wages according to his productivity, and 
wage differentials across different educational types merely reflects that high-ability 
individuals sort into the educational types generating the higher wage return. Nevertheless, 
Arcidiacono (2004) finds large differences in wage returns to different college majors, even 
after controlling for ability sorting. He concludes that preferences for different educational 
types dominate the high ability individual's choice of major. In the present paper I concentrate 
on the consumption value of education as a motivation behind the individual’s educational 
choice. 
The consumption value of education consists among other things of the joy of learning 
new things, meeting new people, moving to a new city, and participating in campus and 
student activities. In addition, there often is an increase in status or self-image that comes 
from being a student of particular fields (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). Higher education also 
generates a certain consumption value after its completion, through status (Dolton et al. 
1989),  possibilities for interesting and challenging jobs (Weisbrod, 1962), and through 
performing what the individual considers important social tasks, or rather a calling.
3
                                                 
3 The latter is known as intrinsic motivation in a related strand of literature, where the main focus is on the 
motivations for doing a particular task or choosing a particular job, as well as on performance and teaching 
behaviour, see for instance Barnabou and Tirole (2003). 
 The   3 
consumption value of different types of education varies across individuals, as it depends on 
individual preferences. It is not always straightforward to distinguish between investment 
motives and consumption motives. Higher education reduces the risk for unemployment 
(Bishop, 1994), and different educational types generate varying future income risks, 
measured by the variance of wage return (Christiansen et al., 2007). The reduced income risk 
that follows from choosing a particular type of education would normally be counted as an 
investment motive, as it directly affects the wage return to education. But if the individual is 
risk averse and derives direct utility from reduced risk, this could also be counted as a 
consumption motive. 
      Increasing attention is given to the consumption value of education in the economic 
literature. Schaafsma (1976), Lazaer (1977), Kodde and Ritzen (1984), and Gullason (1989) 
all argued that the consumption motive is important for the individual's educational decision. 
More recent, Osterbeek and Webbink (1995) and Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2000) find that 
young individuals invest too much in education compared with what is optimal from the 
human capital theory. Heckman et al. (1999) find that high-ability individuals enjoy positive 
consumption value of college. Carneiro et al. (2003) argue that a large part of the return to 
college is non-pecuniary, as does Arcidiacono (2004) when estimating the return to different 
types of college major.
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The present paper argues that the consumption motive is an important determinant for 
an individual’s choice of educational type. It adds to the literature by providing a discussion 
of the concept of the consumption value of education, and by providing a rough estimate for 
the willingness to pay for the consumption value of one particular type of education in a 
compensating differentials framework. In doing so, one cannot merely compare different rates 
of wage return to different types of higher education (as for instance provided by the OECD 
in the “Education at a glance” publications), since part of the wage differentials across 
educational types is due to ability sorting. The present paper controls for innate ability level, 
and still documents substantial differences in wage return across educational types. An 
important point is also that as wage returns to different educational types differ over time, one 
cannot use the actual wage returns of the graduates when estimating their willingness to pay 
for the consumption value of education. It is the expected wage differentials at the time of the 
educational choice that matter, as they constitute the information available to the individual at 
 
                                                 
4 There is also a growing theoretical literature on tax effects on the educational choice in the presence of non-
pecuniary returns to education, as is seen in Alstadsæter (2003) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) on the choice 
of educational level, in Dur and Glazer (2008) on tuition fees and college attendance, and in Alstadsæter, Larsen 
and Kolm (2008) on the choice of higher educational type.   4 
the time of the educational choice. This paper provides estimates for the wage differential at 
the time of the educational choice, as well as the actual wage differential experienced by the 
individuals.  
I document that individuals who attended Teacher's College in Norway during the 
1960's paid a high price for the joy of attending this type of higher education. The benchmark 
education generated a substantially higher wage return, and required the same average grade 
level from High School for admittance, such that I to some extent control for ability. Both the 
ex ante and ex post prices are calculated. The Teacher's College graduates' minimum 
willingness to pay for the consumption value of Teacher's College at the time of the 
educational choice was 34% of the present value of their potential lifetime income. There is 
considerable uncertainty associated with the educational choice, and the individuals make 
their choices based on expectations. It turned out that the actual price the Teacher's College 
graduates ended up paying for the consumption value of Teacher's College was 39% of the 
present value of their potential lifetime income. These calculated differences in present values 
depend on the chosen discount rate, as the wage differential between the two group increases 
over time. Thus, a higher discount rate puts less emphasis on future earnings, and this reduces 
the differences in the present value of future income at the time of the educational choice. The 
goal of the paper is not to find the exact size of the willingness to pay for the consumption 
value of Teacher's College, but rather to emphasize that the consumption value of education 
can be a dominant factor behind the individual's choice of educational type, and to propose 
one method for measuring this. 
Section 2 argues that Business School can be considered a benchmark for the wage 
potential for the Norwegian Teacher's College graduates during the 1960's. The data and 
method are presented in section 3, and the ex ante and ex post prices of the consumption value 
of Teacher's College are estimated in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses 
other methods for measuring the consumption value of education. 
 
2. Teachers' College vs. Business School during the 1960's 
    During the 1960's, the same average grade level from High School was required for 
admission to Business School and Teacher's College in Norway, even though the wage return 
to Business School was superior to that to Teacher's College, as pointed out by Aarrestad 
(1969, 1972). It is remarkable that teaching was such a popular profession, given that teachers 
had modest salaries compared with many other jobs available to skilled individuals. We thus   5 
define teachers' college during the 1960's as an educational type with a high consumption 
value, as it attracts high-skilled individuals even though it generated a low wage return. 
      Even though the Teacher's College graduates could have attended Business School and 
received a higher wage return, they still chose to attend Teacher's College. Hence they were 
willing to forgo future wages in order to enjoy the consumption value of Teacher's College. 
They could have chosen other fields of study as well, but Business School is chosen as a 
benchmark because it has about the same admission requirements, but very different wage 
return. 
 
2.1   Admission requirements for Teachers' College and Business 
School during the 1960's. 
 
    It is a general perception that during the 1960's it was just as difficult to be admitted to 
Teacher's College as to Business School in Norway. Aarrestad (1969) states on page 69: "The 
demand for Teacher's College education far exceeds the supply. The minimum requirement 
for admission has the last years been above 60 grade points (from High School)." Also, on 
page 75 he states: "The admission requirements for the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration are not quite clear. With maximum awarded additional points, it is 
today possible to be admitted with about 60 grade points from High School." Admission 
depended on average grade points at graduation from High School. But additional competition 
points were awarded for previous education and work experience, and for extracurricular 
activities, and the guidelines for awarding additional points varied across institutions. 
      Admission to Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration was 
administrated by the school's own admission board. Similarly, the admission to the 14 teacher 
colleges throughout the country was traditionally administrated by the colleges themselves. 
But complaints were addressed by the central Teacher Education Council. From 1967 and 
onward this council administrated all admission to Norwegian teacher colleges. There are no 
public statistics on the admission requirements for the various schools, but sporadic 
information on admission to Teachers' College and Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration exist in the National Archive and in the archives of Norwegian 
School of Economics and Busyness Administration, respectively. This information is 
displayed in table 2 in the appendix. 
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2.2  Differences in the two educational types. 
 
    Even though the cut-off level of average grades from High School is about the same for the 
two educational types, this does not mean that the distribution of ability, or more specifically, 
average grades, is the same for the two groups. Teachers mostly get the same wage 
independent of performance, while wages are more individual specific in the private sector. 
Hence the wage incentive to choose Business School is higher the more skilled the individual 
is. 
   Also, there were considerably fewer students admitted to Business School than to 
Teachers' College, which means that not all teacher students could have been admitted to 
Business School. Still, a substantial number of the top teacher students would have been 
admitted to Business School, had they applied. 
      Teacher's College covers a wide range of subjects, whereas some are optional, such 
that the student to some extent can choose his major. Teacher's College qualifies for teaching 
in both elementary school and junior High School. Most teachers' college graduates were 
employed in the public sector, where the employer had monopsony power and individual 
wage negotiations were as good as non-existing. Business School also covers a wide range of 
subjects, whereas some are optimal. The majority of Business School graduates were 
employed in the private sector, with a more flexible wage structure and with the possibility 
for individual wage negotiations. 
      There were no tuition fees to pay, but the students still had to finance their living 
expenses. The existence of publicly provided and subsidized student loans available to all 
students eliminates, or at least reduces, the liquidity constraints that might otherwise be 
present. During most of the 1960's, Teacher's College had a two-year duration, while Business 
School had a three-year duration. The major cost of acquiring higher education, namely 
forgone labor income, is thus higher for Business School graduates. Therefore part of the 
wage gap between the two educational types is compensation for the higher investment costs 
of Business School.  
      Only annual earnings are available in the data. We might expect that some of the wage 
return to Business School is due to longer working hours. Thus, part of the wage gap might be 
due to differences in hours worked. This would reduce the price on the consumption value of 
Teachers’ College, measured in foregone earnings by not choosing Business School. 
  But, as we will see in the following section, the wage differentials between these two 
educational types are huge, both ex ante and ex post. So even if some of the differentials are   7 
due to the factors discussed above, the results still document great willingness to pay for the 
consumption value of a particular type of higher education. 
3. Data and methodology 
    Three rich data sets are utilized to measure the consumption value of Teacher's College. 
The 1970 Household Census covers all Norwegian households and individuals and contains 
information on among other things gross income, sex, age, marital status, type and level of 
education, and personal income. The Earnings Register covers all Norwegian adults and 
contains gross individual earnings based on pension rights earned over the period 1967-2000. 
The Core Administrative Register contains information on all Norwegians in the years 1986-
2000. It contains information on birth year, sex, and type and length of highest completed 
education. Only men are considered, as few women attended Business School during the 
1960's. 
3.1 Methodology 
    Apply the compensating differentials model of Rosen (1986) to measure one particular 
individual's valuation of the consumption value of Teacher's College (T) when Business 
School (B) is used as benchmark. The individual maximizes his utility U, which depends 
positively on both ordinary consumption, measured by wage w, and the individual specific 
consumption value of education, e, such that U=u(wi,ei), i=T,B. This is a one-period model, 
but wi and ei can be viewed as present values of lifetime income and consumption value of the 
respective educational types. 
      Now consider an individual who has a higher consumption value of Teacher's College, 
such that eT > eB. Let wB* be the wage return to Business School that the individual requires in 
order to be indifferent between the two educational types when Teacher's College generates 
the market wage return wT . Now define the difference D= wB*- wT as the individual 
compensating wage differential required to make the individual indifferent between the two 
educational types. Thus D is the individual's willingness to pay for the consumption value of 
Teacher's College. Let W= wB- wT be the market compensating wage differential, defined as 
the difference in the market wage returns to Business School and Teacher's College. The 
individual attends Teacher's College if D>W, since the market wage premium to Business 
School does not compensate him for the foregone consumption value by not choosing 
Teacher's College.   8 
      The market compensating wage differential is the market price of the consumption 
value of Teacher's College, and it is available to all individuals. The individual compensating 
wage differential varies across individuals, and this ensures the existence of economic rent in 
the labour market. Most individuals who attend Business School receive an economic rent of 
the size W-D. The marginal individual earns no economic rent, while most individuals who 
choose Teacher's College also receive an economic rent, since their willingness to pay for the 
consumption value of Teacher's College is higher than the actual price demanded by the 
market in the form of the market compensating wage differential. The conclusion from this is 
that the market compensating wage differential serves as a lower bound on the willingness to 
pay for the consumption value of Teacher's College among the individuals choosing it. 
  The market compensating wage differential W is above defined in the absence of 
taxes. Income taxes would reduce the net market compensating wage differential. The 
consumption value of education is a tax free return to human capital investments.  
 
3.2 Selection problems 
    Individuals differ both in over-all ability level and in multi-dimensional ability. If high-
ability individuals to a greater extent choose Business School, the wage return to this 
educational type is higher than other individuals would get. This tends to overstate the market 
compensating wage differential and also the willingness to pay for the consumption value of 
Teacher's College. Also, if individuals select into the educational type for which they have a 
comparative advantage, Willis and Rosen (1979) emphasize that there will be unobserved 
heterogeneity. This means that a good teacher would not necessarily have made a business 
leader, and that the individuals maximize their income and utility according to their abilities 
and preferences. This is in contrast to the one-factor-ability-as-IQ literature that says that the 
best teachers would also have made the best business leaders. 
      Two approaches to solve the first selection problem are the growing identical-twin 
study literature (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998) and changes in compulsory school laws 
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). The present paper proposes an alternative approach. The 
identification strategy is to compare individuals with approximately the same average grade 
level at High School graduation, but who choose different types of higher education. Average 
minimum grade level for admittance is here used as a proxy for ability level of the students, as 
previously discussed in section 2. The individuals who attended Teacher's College during the 
1960's could have attended Business School and experienced a much higher wage return.   9 
Thus the wage return to Business School is the benchmark for their potential future wage 
return. This does not mean that Business School has a low or negative consumption value for 
the individuals actually choosing to attend Business School. Here we only consider the 
consumption value of Teacher's College for the individuals choosing this type of education.  
      The individual makes his educational choice based on the expected future wage 
returns to the two educational types. A good proxy for the future market wage differential, W, 
is the present market wage differential. But as there is a substantial lag from when the 
individual makes his educational choice to when the wage return to education is generated, 
the actual market wage differential he experiences might very well be a different one. Thus a 
Teacher's College graduate's willingness to pay for the consumption value of Teacher's 
College at the time of the educational choice can be different from the price he actually ends 
up paying. See Cunha and Heckman (2007) for more on the ex ante vs. ex post return to 
schooling. 
 
4. The ex ante price of the consumption value of Teacher's 
College 
 
    I use the 1970 Household Census to estimate earnings profiles by potential work experience 
for males with completed Teacher's College and Business School. These cross-section wage 
profiles are interpreted as the Teacher's College and Business School attendants' expected 
future earnings profiles when they made their educational choice in the 1960's. As there is no 
information on actual working experience for the individuals, define potential experience, Xp, 
as the age of the individual minus the age at school enrolment minus the duration of the 
education minus a year for mandatory military service. Only individuals with 30 years of 
potential experience or less are included because of a very small sample of Business School 
graduates with more than 30 years of potential experience. This leaves us with a sample of 
2106 Business School graduates and 6731 Teacher’s College graduates. The average annual 
wages by years of potential experience are listed in table 3 in the appendix. The average wage 
after one year of potential experience is at a much lower level than for two and three years of 
potential experience. This is due to the fact that the students mostly graduate in June / July, 
and thus only are able to work parts of the first year. 
The earnings of the Business School graduates constitute the potential income for the 
Teacher's College graduates. Hence their minimum willingness to pay for the consumption   10 
value of Teacher's College is the market compensating wage differential. The estimation 
approach differs from Mincer's, since the duration of the education is fixed. The specification 
below is estimated separately for each group using ordinary least squares: 
(1)  lnW=α1+α2Xp+ Xp
2+ε.  
Smoothed versions of the wage profiles for 30 years of work experience from the 1970 census 
are shown in figure 1 below. The Teacher's College graduates pay a substantial wage 
premium, and this wage premium increases over their career. The earnings vary more among 
Business School graduates than among Teacher's College graduates. This may to some extent 
be due to the fact that most teachers work in the public sector where the wage level is set by 
centralized negotiations. The government is the employer and exercises monopsony power. 
Business School graduates, on the other hand, mostly work in the private sector, where wage 
negotiations are local and the wage structure is more flexible. 
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These are gross wages, and the presence of a progressive income tax would most likely 
reduce the wage gap and thus the price on Teacher's College as a consumption good. The 
existence of a substantial willingness to pay for the consumption value of Teacher's College is 
still non-dismissible. 
Let us now calculate the present value of the individual’s life time income at the time 
of the educational choice, defined as 30 years from start of the education. The difference in 
duration of the two educational types is accounted for by setting the income of the two first 
years to be 0 for Teacher College. Business School has three year duration, so set the income   11 
for the first three years to zero for this educational type. The present value, PV, of the future 
income stream of educational type i at time of the educational decision is then given by 









i y PV ,     
where i = T,S denominates the educational type Teachers’ College (T) and Business School 
(B), and yt, denominates the average income at t years from the time of the educational choice. 
For Teacher’s college, the average wage at t years in the future is the average wage of 
Teacher’s College graduates at max{0,t-2} years of potential experience, while it for Business 
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The results are reported in table 1 below. We there see that individuals who attend Teacher's 
College are willing to pay a substantial price for the consumption value of their education, 
measured by foregone potential gross lifetime income. As the wage differentials increase over 
time, it matters which discount rate is used for the calculation. The more weight the individual 
puts on future earnings, the lower his discount rate, and the higher the price of the 
consumption value of Teacher's College measured in forgone potential income. At a 3% 
discount rate, the price of the consumption value of Teachers’ College is 35%, measured in 
foregone wage return by not attending Business School. This price reduces to 33% of 
potential gross earnings when applying a 7% discount rate. 
 
Table 1  Present value of the ex ante expected income stream (average wages by 
potential experience) 30 years from the educational decision is made. 
 







Foregone wage return 
by choosing Teachers’ 
College 
3  1 020 783  660 891  35 % of potential wage 
5  747 305  513 505  34 % of potential wage 
7  561 207  373 343  33 % of potential wage 
 
The different duration of the two educational types matters if the individual has a high 
discount rate, as discussed by Bowles (1972), Ainslie and Haslam (1992), and Osterbeek and 
van Ophem (2000). He then wants to start earning money as soon as possible, which might 
induce him to choose Teacher's College rather than Business School.   12 
The wage return to Business School varies more across individuals than the wage return to 
Teachers’ College, where the wage is set uniformly in the public sector. This might induce a 
risk averse individual to choose Teachers’ College. 
5. The ex post price of the consumption value of Teacher's 
College 
    The previous section estimated the ex ante willingness to pay for the consumption value of 
Teacher's College among the individuals acquiring their education in the 1960's. Did these 
individuals end up paying a higher or lower price than expected for this consumption value? 
    Now combine the Earnings Register and the Core Administrative Register to estimate the 
actual wage profiles of all individuals attending and graduating from Business School and 
Teacher's College during the 1960's. We have information on their annual gross income from 
1967 to 2000. Unfortunately, the graduation date is missing for these early cohorts.  
Therefore, I use their date of birth, add 19 years (to complete High School) to find the time 
when they most likely started their higher education. To be sure to include all males that 
acquired their education during the 1960's, I include all Norwegian males with completed 
Teacher's College and Business School who were born between 1942 and 1951. This leaves 
us with 1253 Business School graduates with a total of 34,292 observations, and 3974 
Teacher's College graduates with a total of 113,997 observations. Potential working 
experience ranges from 1 to 30 years. The average annual wages by years of potential 
experience are listed in table 3 in the appendix. 
    Apply the same empirical specification as in equation (1) to estimate the actual wage 
profiles that these individuals experienced after graduation, but now estimate with robust 
standard errors. The estimation results are reported in table 4 in the appendix, and smoothed 
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Figure 2. Actual wage profiles of Teachers’ College and Business School who started 
their education in the 1960’s.  
 
 
The ex post wage profiles differ from the ex ante wage profiles, and the wage gap at 
the beginning of the career is smaller than predicted from the expected wage profiles in the 
previous section. Part of the reason for this low wage differential at the beginning of the 
career is the fact that the students normally graduate in the summer, such that the income 
during the first year they are working only amounts to half a year’s work. We do not have 
information on working hours, and cannot correct for this, neither can we correct for possible 
part-time work. Business School graduates experienced rapid wage increases over their 
careers, relative to the Teacher's College graduates, as is clearly seen in figure 2. Part of the 
reason for these high wage differentials might be that observations from the 1980's are 
included in the sample, a period where the private sector enjoyed high wage increases relative 
to the public sector. 
Now use the same method as in equation (2) in the previous section to find the actual 
difference in the present lifetime income of the two educational types at the time of the 
educational choice. The results are displayed in table 2 below. The ex post price on the 
consumption value of Teacher's College is 36% of the potential life time income at a 7% 
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Table 2  Present value of the ex post actual income stream (average wages by potential 
experience) 30 years from the educational decision was made. 
 







Foregone wage return 
by choosing Teachers’ 
College 
3  1 223 688  725 577  41 % of potential wage 
5  876 909  537 926  39 % of potential wage 
7  644 944  409 575  36 % of potential wage 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
    The present paper argues for the existence of an individual specific consumption value of 
education for which the individual is willing to pay. I to some extent control for ability sorting 
by using minimum required grade level from High School for admittance at Teacher’s 
College and Business School as a proxy for ability. The individuals who attended Teacher's 
College in Norway during the 1960's expected to earn substantially less than their potential 
earnings. Their potential earnings are defined as the wage return they would have achieved 
had they instead chosen Business School. The full ex ante willingness to pay for the 
consumption value of Teacher’s College at the time of the educational choice is at a 5 % 
discount rate calculated as 34 % of the present value of their potential lifetime income.  
We also observe the actual wage profiles of the individuals who attended Teacher’s 
College and Business School during the 1960’s. It turns out that the wage differential during 
their first year of work was smaller than they might expect based on the wages levels in the 
two professions at the time of their educational choice. This can also be due to some 
measurement error, as potential experience is used to calculate wage return per year of 
experience. The actual wage differentials of the Teacher’s College and Business School 
graduates increased over time. This can to some extent be caused by differences in working 
hours, which we do not observe. It is also partly due to a skewed real income growth, 
especially during the 1980’s. Business School graduates to a large extent work in the private 
sector, while Teacher’s College graduates mainly work in the public sector, where the wage 
growth is modest compared to the private sector. At a 5% discount rate, the ex post price on 
the consumption value of Teacher's College during the 1960's turned out to be 39 % of the 
present value of the individuals' potential lifetime income.    15 
  Other methods for measuring the consumption value of education could be to compare 
enrolment rates of different types of educations to the wage levels of these educational types 
over time, corresponding to the work by Fredriksson (1997). High enrolment rates to 
educational types with low wage levels would indicate the presence of a strong consumption 
motive in the educational choice. Another approach, taken by Christiansen et al. (2007), is to 
study the risk-return trade-off of different types of educational types. They identify which 
educational types are efficient investment assets, in the sense that the income risk is 
compensated by a higher wage return, and which educational types are inefficient investment 
assets and thus seem to be chosen out of consumption motives. Under both these approaches, 
there is a need to control for ability sorting.  
    The willingness to pay for the consumption value of education can vary over time and 
across countries. It is likely that in an egalitarian country like Norway, with small wage 
differentials, high taxes, no tuition fees, subsidized student loans and a broad social security 
system that provides a minimum income for all will induce the individuals to attach more 
weight to the consumption value of education when making their educational choice. By 
providing higher public education free of charge to the students the government removes 
liquidity constraints for many individuals and enable a higher participation rate in higher 
education. As the social returns to many types of education are higher than the private returns, 
this increased participation rate in higher education is a desired effect of public stimulus 
policies. But these policies to some extent also subsidize private consumption of certain types 
of higher education.  
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Table 1: Return to schooling and attendance rates in tertiary education.
Percentage of men, age 25-
34, who have attended tertiary 
education.*
Rate of return to schooling. Men 
only.**
Japan 51 8




New Zealand 37 3
Ireland 36 9
United States 36 7
United Kingdom 36 13
Norway 35 2
Spain 34 5





*Source: OECD Education at a Glance, 2008. Numbers from 2006.
** Source: Trostel et al. (2002)  
 
 
Table 2:   Admission requirements for Teachers’ College and Business School 
 
Year  Teachers’ College
1 







   
1964 
    Ca. 69 TP 
1965  65-73 TP, depending on college.
 
The most popular colleges in the southern 
part: minimum 70-73 CP. 
 
 
Ca. 68 TP 
1966  65 TP in Tromsø Teachers’ College.
 
Same as in 1965, when the most populaer 
colleges had admission limits at 5-8 
points above this. 
 
 
Ca. 67 TP 
1967    66 TP 
 
1968    66 TP 
 
1969  Average 64.3 GP, st.dev. 4.54. 




1970  Average 62.5 GP, st.dev. 5.13.
 
  67 TP 
 
GP: Grade points from High School. 
TP: Total competition points. TP= GP + awarded additional points (for work experience and 
extracurricular activities). 
116 Teacher Colleges throughout Norway, including one very popular in Bergen. Information on admission requirements was found in the 
archives of the Teacher Education Council in the National Archive of Norway and is available on request.  
2 Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, in Bergen. All information on admission requirements was found in 
     attachments to board meetings in the respective autumn meetings of the board. 
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1970-cencus, expected wages 





   Business School   Teacher's College       Business School   Teacher's College 
Obs.  Average wage  Obs.  Average wage    Obs.  Average wage  Obs.  Average wage 
1  162 
                       
31 869   524 
                          
18 966     977 
                          
24 412   2999 
                           
21 508  
2  141 
                          
38 943   595 
                           
24 713     1136 
                          
33 078   3664 
                           
25 705  
3  120 
                          
44 351   638 
                           
27 226     1183 
                          
41 348   3834 
                           
28 933  
4  96 
                          
46 008   574 
                           
29 884     1188 
                          
47 587   3889 
                           
31 671  
5  113 
                          
47 462   481 
                           
31 295     1193 
                          
52 985   3925 
                           
33 639  
6  84 
                          
54 948   358 
                           
32 017     1192 
                          
56 767   3941 
                           
35 779  
7  97 
                          
55 137   338 
                           
34 447     1192 
                          
59 988   3929 
                           
37 802  
8  85 
                          
54 460   285 
                           
34 964     1194 
                          
62 817   3929 
                           
39 499  
9  81 
                          
59 020   292 
                           
36 593     1197 
                          
65 657   3929 
                           
41 281  
10  65 
                          
63 074   233 
                           
36 190     1193 
                          
67 707   3927 
                           
42 687  
11  60 
                          
72 237   235 
                           
39 188     1192 
                          
70 738   3922 
                           
43 503  
12  62 
                          
62 998   170 
                           
39 062     1196 
                          
73 473   3917 
                           
43 742  
13  51 
                          
63 378   164 
                           
40 163     1188 
                          
75 924   3910 
                           
43 815  
14  59 
                          
64 239   130 
                           
41 481     1181 
                          
80 194   3906 
                           
44 314  
15  57 
                          
83 602   137 
                           
41 402     1187 
                          
83 837   3893 
                           
45 162  
16  80 
                          
68 981   141 
                           
43 219     1176 
                          
87 116   3896 
                           
45 951  
17  74 
                          
73 119   158 
                           
43 563     1186 
                          
93 812   3908 
                           
46 865  
18  64 
                          
68 116   118 
                           
44 174     1184 
                          
97 614   3894 
                           
47 850  
19  62 
                          
71 694   159 
                           
43 932     1188 
                        
101 304   3882 
                           
48 622  
20  66 
                          
66 399   136 
                           
45 929     1188 
                        
100 813   3884 
                           
49 187  
21  70 
                          
73 396   143 
                           
45 434     1188 
                        
105 250   3881 
                           
49 877  
22  72 
                          
75 429   128 
                           
44 020     1179 
                        
109 737   3877 
                           
49 957  
23  66 
                          
69 432   129 
                           
46 984     1175 
                        
107 165   3862 
                           
49 830  
24  47 
                          
71 138   113 
                           
44 022     1173 
                        
110 618   3845 
                           
50 039  
25  58 
                          
80 895   118 
                           
43 993     1168 
                        
111 989   3834 
                           
50 178  
26  54 
                          
79 863   89 
                           
46 679     1151 
                        
126 679   3820 
                           
50 473  
27  42 
                          
75 898   111 
                           
45 249     1106 
                        
118 231   3730 
                           
50 882  
28  33 
                          
73 458   82 
                           
47 845     1026 
                        
127 015   3607 
                           
51 310  
29  31 
                          
79 177   65 
                           
43 722     897 
                        
129 651   3447 
                           
51 824  
30  25 
                          
75 670   79 
                           
43 734     761 
                        
130 540   3116 
                           
52 369    20 
 
 
Table 4:    Regression results. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
  1970-census, expected wages 
 
OLS 
Earnings register, actual wages 
 
OLS, robust standard errors 
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